Arbeitspapier

Workplace Incentives and Organizational Learning

This paper studies learning within organizations when incentives change. We use a simple principal-agent model to show how, in the presence of imperfect information over the shape of the production function, worker's effort choice changes over time as information is disclosed and processed. We also show that changes in workers compensation can trigger such learning process. We test this hypothesis using personnel records from a Peruvian egg production plant. Exploiting a sudden change in the compensation schedule, we find that workers learn from each other over the shape of the production function. This adjustment process is costly for the firm.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 13898

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
Production; Cost; Capital; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity; Capacity
Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
Production Management
Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
Personnel Economics: Labor Management
Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
Thema
organizational learning
workplace incentives
inputs

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Amodio, Francesco
Martinez-Carrasco, Miguel A.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2020

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Amodio, Francesco
  • Martinez-Carrasco, Miguel A.
  • Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2020

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