Arbeitspapier

Inputs, Incentives, and Self-Selection at the Workplace

This paper studies how asymmetric information over inputs affects workers' response to incentives and self-selection at the workplace. Using daily records from a Peruvian egg production plant, we exploit a sudden change in the worker salary structure and find that workers' effort, firm profits, and worker participation change differentially along the two margins of input quality and worker type. Firm profits increase differentially from high productivity workers, but absenteeism and quits of these workers also differentially increase. Evidence shows that information asymmetries over inputs between workers and managers shape the response to incentives and self-selection at the workplace.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 12840

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
Production; Cost; Capital; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity; Capacity
Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
Production Management
Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
Personnel Economics: Labor Management
Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
Thema
asymmetric information
input heterogeneity
incentives
self-selection

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Amodio, Francesco
Martinez-Carrasco, Miguel A.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2019

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Amodio, Francesco
  • Martinez-Carrasco, Miguel A.
  • Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2019

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