Arbeitspapier
Social Interaction, Co-Worker Altruism, and Incentives
Social interaction with colleagues is an important job attribute for many workers. To attract and retain workers, managers therefore need to think about how to create and preserve high-quality co-worker relationships. This paper develops a principal-multi-agent model where agents do not only engage in productive activities, but also in social interaction with their colleagues, which in turn creates co-worker altruism. We study how financial incentives for productive activities can improve or damage the work climate. We show that both team incentives and relative incentives can help to create a good work climate. We discuss some empirical evidence supporting these predictions.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 08-094/1
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Economics of Contract: Theory
Labor Contracts
Personnel Economics: General
- Thema
-
social interaction
altruism
incentive contracts
co-worker satisfaction
Betriebsklima
Arbeitsgruppe
Altruismus
Leistungsanreiz
Arbeitszufriedenheit
Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Dur, Robert
Sol, Joeri
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (wo)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (wann)
-
2008
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Dur, Robert
- Sol, Joeri
- Tinbergen Institute
Entstanden
- 2008
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