Artikel

Dynamic monopoly with relational incentives

This paper studies the price-setting problem of a monopoly that in each time period has the option of failing to deliver its good after receiving payment. The monopoly may be induced to deliver the good if consumers expect that the monopoly will not deliver in the future if it does not deliver today. If the good is non-durable and consumers are anonymous, the monopoly's optimal strategy is to set price equal to the static monopoly price each period if the discount factor is high enough, and otherwise to set the lowest price at which it can credibly promise to deliver the good. If the good is durable, we derive an intuitive lower bound on the monopoly's optimal profit for any discount factor and show that it converges to the optimal static monopoly profit as the discount factor converges to one, in contrast to the Coase conjecture. We also show that rationing the good is never optimal for the monopoly if there is an efficient resale market and that the best equilibrium in which the monopoly always delivers involves a strictly decreasing price path that asymptotes to a level weakly above the ratio of the monopoly's marginal cost to the discount factor.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 5 ; Year: 2010 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 479-518 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Monopoly
Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
Thema
Coase conjecture
durable goods
monopoly pricing
non-durable goods
rationing
relational incentives

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Wolitzky, Alexander
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
The Econometric Society
(wo)
New Haven, CT
(wann)
2010

DOI
doi:10.3982/TE701
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

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Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Wolitzky, Alexander
  • The Econometric Society

Entstanden

  • 2010

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