Arbeitspapier
Norms and Guilt
It has been argued that guilt aversion (the aversion to violate others’ expectations) and the compliance to descriptive social norms (the aversion to act differently than others in the same situation) are important drivers of human behavior. We show in a formal model that both motives are empirically indistinguishable when only one benchmark (another person’s expectation or a norm) is revealed as each of these benchmarks signals information on the other one. To address this problem, we experimentally study how individuals react when both benchmarks are revealed simultaneously. We find that both types of information affect transfers in the dictator game. At the same time, the effect of the recipient’s expectation is non-monotonic as dictators use the disclosed expectation in a self-serving way to decrease transfers.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 6999
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Expectations; Speculations
- Subject
-
guilt aversion
social norms
conformity
dictator game
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Danilov, Anastasia
Khalmetski, Kiryl
Sliwka, Dirk
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (where)
-
Munich
- (when)
-
2018
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Danilov, Anastasia
- Khalmetski, Kiryl
- Sliwka, Dirk
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Time of origin
- 2018
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