Envy and Compassion in Tournaments

Arbeitspapier

Many experiments indicate that most individuals are not purely motivated by material self interest, but also care about the well being of others. In this paper we examine tournaments among inequity averse agents, who dislike disadvantageous inequity (envy) and advantageous inequity (compassion). It turns out that inequity averse agents exert higher effort levels than purely self-interested agents for a given prize structure. Contrary to standard tournament theory first-best efforts can not be implemented when prizes are endogenous. Several extensions are studied like the case of spiteful agents, sabotage, asymmetric agents and an application on the choice between vertical and lateral promotions within firms.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 647

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement ; Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects ; Personnel Economics: Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions
• Thema: tournaments ; promotions ; inequity aversion ; Erwerbsverlauf ; Wettbewerb ; Spieltheorie ; Leistungsmotivation ; Gerechtigkeit ; Theorie ; Tournament ; inequity aversion

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Grund, Christian ; Sliwka, Dirk
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
• (wo): Bonn
• (wann): 2002

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20846
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 20.09.2024, 08:22 MESZ