Arbeitspapier
Trust as a signal of a social norm and the hidden costs of incentive schemes
An explanation for motivation crowding-out phenomena is developed in a social preferences framework. Besides selfish and fair or altruistic types a third type of agents is introduced: These 'conformists' have social preferences if they believe that sufficiently many of the others do too. When there is asymmetric information about the distribution of preferences (the 'social norm'), the incentive scheme offered or autonomy granted can reveal a principal's beliefs about that norm. High-powered incentives may crowd out motivation as pessimism about the norm is conveyed. But by choosing fixed wages or granting autonomy the principal may signal trust in a favorable social norm.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 2293
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Subject
-
Anreizvertrag
Soziale Norm
Vertrauen
Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion
Agency Theory
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Sliwka, Dirk
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- (where)
-
Bonn
- (when)
-
2006
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Sliwka, Dirk
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Time of origin
- 2006
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