Arbeitspapier

Performance Pay and Risk Aversion

A main prediction of agency theory is the well known risk-incentive trade-off. Incentive contracts should be found in environments with little uncertainty and for agents with low degrees of risk aversion. There is an ongoing debate in the literature about the first trade-off. Due to lack of data, there has so far been hardly any empirical evidence about the second. Making use of a unique representative data set, we find clear evidence that risk aversion has a highly significant and substantial negative impact on the probability that an employee's pay is performance contingent.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 101

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: General
Thema
Agency theory
GSOEP
Incentives
Pay for performance
Performance appraisal
Risk
Risk aversion

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Grund, Christian
Sliwka, Dirk
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
(wo)
München
(wann)
2006

DOI
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13450
Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13450-8
Letzte Aktualisierung
20.09.2024, 08:25 MESZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Grund, Christian
  • Sliwka, Dirk
  • Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)

Entstanden

  • 2006

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