Arbeitspapier

Fiscal federalism and public inputs provision: vertical externalities matter

This paper studies the provision of public inputs in a federal system. A vertical tax externality is also considered in a simple general equilibrium model used to analyze the efficiency of equilibria under different scenarios. The results show that the state provision of public inputs may affect ambiguously federal tax revenues, depending on the vertical tax externality, amongst others issues. Moreover, it is proved that achieving a second best allocation is not straightforward for a federal government that plays as Stackelberg leader. At this point, the state’s reaction function becomes crucial when the design of vertical grants is restricted.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: ECB Working Paper ; No. 484

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
Fiscal federalism
productive public spending
vertical externality
Finanzbeziehungen
Finanzausgleich
Allokationseffizienz
Steuerwirkung
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Martínez-López, Diego
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
European Central Bank (ECB)
(where)
Frankfurt a. M.
(when)
2005

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Martínez-López, Diego
  • European Central Bank (ECB)

Time of origin

  • 2005

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