Vertical Licensing, Input Pricing, and Entry

Arbeitspapier

We explore the incentives of a vertically integrated incumbent firm to license the production technology of its core input to an external firm, transforming the licensee into its input supplier. We find that the incumbent opts for licensing even when licensing also transforms the licensee into one of its direct competitors in the final products market. In fact, the licensee's entry into the final products market, although increases the competition and the cost that the licensor faces, it reinforces, instead of weakens, the licensing incentives. Furthermore, the licensee's entry augments the positive welfare implications of vertical licensing.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 6316

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Firm Organization and Market Structure ; Contracting Out; Joint Ventures; Technology Licensing ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts ; Rationing; Licensing
• Thema: licensing ; vertical relations ; entry ; two-part tariffs ; outsourcing

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Bakaouka, Elpiniki ; Milliou, Chrysovalantou
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (wo): Munich
• (wann): 2017

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/155558
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ