Arbeitspapier
Vertical Product Differentiation, Market Entry, and Welfare
This paper analyses a model of vertical product differentiation with one incumbent and one entrant firm. It is shown that if firms can produce only one quality level welfare in this entry game can be lower than in monopoly. This is the case if qualities are strategic complements because the incumbent may distort its quality downwards. If firms can produce a quality range and practice non-linear pricing welfare in case of entry deterrence is higher than in monopoly because the incumbent enlarges its product line. If entry is accommodated consumer rent increases but the consequences on welfare are ambiguous.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Munich Discussion Paper ; No. 2004-28
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Chemicals; Rubber; Drugs; Biotechnology; Plastics
- Thema
-
Entry Deterrence
Price Discrimination
Vertical Differentiation
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Reisinger, Markus
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät
- (wo)
-
München
- (wann)
-
2004
- DOI
-
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.479
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-479-5
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Reisinger, Markus
- Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät
Entstanden
- 2004