Arbeitspapier

Vertical Product Differentiation, Market Entry, and Welfare

This paper analyses a model of vertical product differentiation with one incumbent and one entrant firm. It is shown that if firms can produce only one quality level welfare in this entry game can be lower than in monopoly. This is the case if qualities are strategic complements because the incumbent may distort its quality downwards. If firms can produce a quality range and practice non-linear pricing welfare in case of entry deterrence is higher than in monopoly because the incumbent enlarges its product line. If entry is accommodated consumer rent increases but the consequences on welfare are ambiguous.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Munich Discussion Paper ; No. 2004-28

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Chemicals; Rubber; Drugs; Biotechnology; Plastics
Thema
Entry Deterrence
Price Discrimination
Vertical Differentiation

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Reisinger, Markus
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät
(wo)
München
(wann)
2004

DOI
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.479
Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-479-5
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Reisinger, Markus
  • Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät

Entstanden

  • 2004

Ähnliche Objekte (12)