Arbeitspapier
The Influence of Product Liability on Vertical Product Differentiation
This paper explores the impact of product liability on vertical product differentiation when product safety is perfectly observable. In a two-stage competition, duopolistic firms are subject to strict liability and segment the market such that a low-safety product is marketed at a low price to consumers with relatively small harm levels whereas the safer product is sold at a high price to consumers with high levels of harm. Firms’ expected liability payments are critically influenced by how the market is segmented, creating a complex relationship between product liability and product differentiation. We vary the liability system’s allocation of losses between firms and consumers. Shifting more losses to firms increases the safety levels of both products, but decreases the degree of product differentiation. Some shifting of losses is always socially beneficial, but the optimum may require that some compensable losses stay with the consumers.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 5315
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- Thema
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product liability
accident
harm
imperfect competition
product safety
vertical product differentiation
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Baumann, Florian
Friehe, Tim
Rasch, Alexander
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
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Munich
- (wann)
-
2015
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Baumann, Florian
- Friehe, Tim
- Rasch, Alexander
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2015