Arbeitspapier

Product liability and reasonable product use

We analyze a monopolist who offers different variants of a possibly dangerous product to heterogeneous customers. Product variants are distinguished by different safety attributes. Customers choose product usage which co- determines expected harm. We find that, even with customers being perfectly informed about product variants' safety, product liability can further welfare by limiting the firm's incentives to distort product safety in pursuance of profit- maximizing price discrimination. In this context, strict liability has to be accompanied by a defense of product misuse, but reasonable use of the base product variant should be defined more leniently than what an application of the Hand rule or instructions in user manuals might prescribe.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: ZEW Discussion Papers ; No. 20-071

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics
Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
Thema
Comparative negligence
Price discrimination
Product liability
Product use

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Baumann, Florian
Rasch, Alexander
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung
(wo)
Mannheim
(wann)
2020

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Baumann, Florian
  • Rasch, Alexander
  • ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung

Entstanden

  • 2020

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