Arbeitspapier
Switching consumers and product liability: on the optimality of incomplete strict liability
This article shows that it may be socially optimal to grant accident victims less than full compensation. In our framework, firms are liable under product liability but also invest in care to prevent consumers switching to competitors. Affecting the partition of consumers by means of care-taking is not desirable from a social standpoint. Consequently, it may be optimal to reduce liability below full compensation in order to adjust firms' care incentives.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; No. 2010,03
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics
- Thema
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Tort law
product liability
care level
asymmetric information
switching
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Baumann, Florian
Friehe, Tim
Grechenig, Kristoffel
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
- (wo)
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Bonn
- (wann)
-
2010
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Baumann, Florian
- Friehe, Tim
- Grechenig, Kristoffel
- Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Entstanden
- 2010