Arbeitspapier
Learning-by-doing in torts: Liability and information about accident technology
In the economic analysis of liability law, information about accident risk and how it can be influenced by precautions is commonly taken for granted. However, a profound understanding of the relationship between care and accident risk often requires learning-by-doing. In a two-period model, we examine the implications for the optimal level of care and behavior under strict liability and negligence, showing that liability law may not induce efficient incentives.
- ISBN
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978-3-86304-193-9
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: DICE Discussion Paper ; No. 194
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics
Externalities
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- Thema
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liability rules
care incentives
accident technology
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Baumann, Florian
Friehe, Tim
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
- (wo)
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Düsseldorf
- (wann)
-
2015
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Baumann, Florian
- Friehe, Tim
- Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
Entstanden
- 2015