Arbeitspapier

Learning-by-doing in torts: Liability and information about accident technology

In the economic analysis of liability law, information about accident risk and how it can be influenced by precautions is commonly taken for granted. However, a profound understanding of the relationship between care and accident risk often requires learning-by-doing. In a two-period model, we examine the implications for the optimal level of care and behavior under strict liability and negligence, showing that liability law may not induce efficient incentives.

ISBN
978-3-86304-193-9
Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: DICE Discussion Paper ; No. 194

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics
Externalities
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Thema
liability rules
care incentives
accident technology

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Baumann, Florian
Friehe, Tim
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
(wo)
Düsseldorf
(wann)
2015

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Baumann, Florian
  • Friehe, Tim
  • Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)

Entstanden

  • 2015

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