Spectrum licensing, policy instruments and market entry

Konferenzbeitrag

Competition policy attempts to address the potential for market failure by encouraging competition in service markets. Often, in wireless communication service markets, national regulatory authorities seek to encourage entry via the spectrum assignment process. Instruments used include the assignment mode (auction or beauty contest), setting aside licenses and providing bidding (price and quantity) credits for potential entrants, and making more licenses (spectrum blocks) available than incumbent firms (excess licenses). The empirical analysis assesses the effectiveness of these policy instruments on encouraging entry. The econometric results show that the probability of entry is enhanced by using auction assignments and excess licenses. Furthermore, quantity, but not price, concessions encourage entry.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: 24th European Regional Conference of the International Telecommunications Society (ITS): "Technology, Investment and Uncertainty", Florence, Italy, 20th-23rd October, 2013

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Economics of Regulation ; Telecommunications
• Thema: spectrum licensing ; policy instruments, market entry

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Madden, Gary ; Bohlin, Erik ; Tran, Thien ; Morey, Aaron
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): International Telecommunications Society (ITS)
• (wo): Calgary
• (wann): 2013

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/88476
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ