Arbeitspapier

Jostling for Advantage: Licensing and Entry into Patent Portfolio Races

Licensing in a patent thicket allows firms to either avoid or resolve hold-up. Firms' R&D incentives depend on whether they license ex ante or ex post. We develop a model of a patent portfolio race, which allows for endogenous R&D efforts, to study firms' choice between ex ante and ex post licensing. The model shows that firms' relationships in product markets and technology space jointly determine the type of licensing contract chosen. In particular, product market competitors are more likely to avoid patent portfolio races, since the threat of hold-up increases. On the other hand, more valuable technologies are more likely to give rise to patent portfolio races. We also discuss the welfare implications of these results.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 184

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Antitrust Policy: Other
Microelectronics; Computers; Communications Equipment
Thema
hold-up problem
licensing
innovation
patent race
patent thicket
research joint ventures

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Siebert, Ralph
von Graevenitz, Georg
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
(wo)
München
(wann)
2006

DOI
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13367
Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13367-7
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Siebert, Ralph
  • von Graevenitz, Georg
  • Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)

Entstanden

  • 2006

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