Jostling for Advantage: Licensing and Entry into Patent Portfolio Races

Arbeitspapier

Licensing in a patent thicket allows firms to either avoid or resolve hold-up. Firms' R&D incentives depend on whether they license ex ante or ex post. We develop a model of a patent portfolio race, which allows for endogenous R&D efforts, to study firms' choice between ex ante and ex post licensing. The model shows that firms' relationships in product markets and technology space jointly determine the type of licensing contract chosen. In particular, product market competitors are more likely to avoid patent portfolio races, since the threat of hold-up increases. On the other hand, more valuable technologies are more likely to give rise to patent portfolio races. We also discuss the welfare implications of these results.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 184

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; Antitrust Policy: Other ; Microelectronics; Computers; Communications Equipment
• Subject: hold-up problem ; licensing ; innovation ; patent race ; patent thicket ; research joint ventures

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Siebert, Ralph ; von Graevenitz, Georg
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
• (where): München
• (when): 2006

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13367
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/94136
• URN: urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13367-7
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET