Arbeitspapier
Vertical fiscal externalities and the environment
We show that imposition of a state-level environmental tax in a federation crowds out pre-existing federal taxes. We explain how this vertical fiscal externality can lead unilateral state-level environmental policy to generate a welfare gain in the implementing state, at the expense of other states, even absent any environmental benefits. Using a computable general equilibrium model of the Canadian federation, we show that vertical fiscal externalities can be the major determinant of the welfare change following environmental policy implementation by a state government. Our numerical simulations indicate that - as a consequence of vertical fiscal externalities - state governments can reduce greenhouse gas emissions by over 20 percent without any net cost to themselves.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Economics Working Paper Series ; No. 16/234
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Computable General Equilibrium Models
Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession
Climate; Natural Disasters and Their Management; Global Warming
- Thema
-
fiscal externality
climate policy
federalism
computable general equilibrium
Umweltpolitik
Ökosteuer
Finanzbeziehungen
Externer Effekt
Szenariotechnik
Sensitivitätsanalyse
Dekompositionsverfahren
Allgemeines Gleichgewicht
Kanada
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Böhringer, Christoph
Rivers, Nicholas
Yonezawa, Hidemichi
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research
- (wo)
-
Zurich
- (wann)
-
2016
- DOI
-
doi:10.3929/ethz-a-010608767
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
20.09.2024, 08:22 MESZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Böhringer, Christoph
- Rivers, Nicholas
- Yonezawa, Hidemichi
- ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research
Entstanden
- 2016