Arbeitspapier

Vertical Control Change and Platform Organization under Network Externalities

In this paper, we examine how the introduction of network externalities impact an open and vertically integrated platform's post-merger contractual relationship with third-party sellers distributing through its marketplace. Regardless of whether the platform uses linear contracts or two-part tariffs, we find that, provided these contracts are public, the platform has no incentive to exclude its non-integrated rivals and that the latter's market share rises as network effects gain importance. Vertical integration serves as a commitment device that open platforms can use to convince potential users (e.g., consumers and developers) that their ecosystem will be large and compelling. Interestingly, when the open platform competes with a closed rival, i.e., with a fully integrated ecosystem, it may find it profitable to subsidize independent third-party sellers to strategically steer demand away from the competing ecosystem. These results have novel managerial implications on the incentives of a platform to open up its ecosystem to third-party sellers, as well as for the regulation of vertical integration in the presence of network effect and when different platforms operate alternative business models.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 9901

Classification
Wirtschaft
Firm Organization and Market Structure
Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
Economics of Regulation
Subject
open ecosystems
network externalities
platforms
vertical integration

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Padilla, Jorge
Piccolo, Salvatore
Shekhar, Shiva
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2022

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Padilla, Jorge
  • Piccolo, Salvatore
  • Shekhar, Shiva
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2022

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