Arbeitspapier
Bertrand competition under network externalities
Two sellers engage in price competition to attract buyers located on a network. The value of the good of either seller to any buyer depends on the number of neighbors on the network who consume the same good. For a generic specification of consumption externalities, we show that an equilibrium price equals the marginal cost if and only if the buyer network is complete or cyclic. When the externalities are approximately linear in the size of consumption, we identify the classes of networks in which one of the sellers monopolizes the market, or the two sellers segment the market.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 884
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Thema
-
graphs
networks
externalities
Bertrand
divide and conquer
discriminatory pricing
monopolization
segmentation
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Aoyagi, Masaki
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
- (wo)
-
Osaka
- (wann)
-
2013
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Aoyagi, Masaki
- Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
Entstanden
- 2013
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