Arbeitspapier
Quotas under dynamic Bertrand competition
We present a new model of dynamic Bertrand competition, where a quota is treated as an intertemporal constraint rather than as a capacity constraint as is common in the literature. The firm under a quota then can still vary the rates of exports over time provided that its total sales within the period do not exceed the quota. We show that a quota results in higher prices than a tariff of equal imports. We also show that firms never play mixed strategies, which contrasts from the result from a one-shot game, in which the only equilibrium under a quota is in mixed strategies.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 718
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
- Subject
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dynamic Bertrand competition
quotas
tariffs
differential game
Importquote
Duopol
Gleichgewichtstheorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Miyagiwa, Kaz
Ohno, Yuka
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
- (where)
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Osaka
- (when)
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2008
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Miyagiwa, Kaz
- Ohno, Yuka
- Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
Time of origin
- 2008
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