Arbeitspapier
Quotas under dynamic Bertrand competition
We present a new model of dynamic Bertrand competition, where a quota is treated as an intertemporal constraint rather than as a capacity constraint as is common in the literature. The firm under a quota then can still vary the rates of exports over time provided that its total sales within the period do not exceed the quota. We show that a quota results in higher prices than a tariff of equal imports. We also show that firms never play mixed strategies, which contrasts from the result from a one-shot game, in which the only equilibrium under a quota is in mixed strategies.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 718
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
- Thema
-
dynamic Bertrand competition
quotas
tariffs
differential game
Importquote
Duopol
Gleichgewichtstheorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Miyagiwa, Kaz
Ohno, Yuka
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
- (wo)
-
Osaka
- (wann)
-
2008
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
- 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Miyagiwa, Kaz
- Ohno, Yuka
- Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
Entstanden
- 2008
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