A theory of multidimensional information disclosure

Arbeitspapier

We study disclosure of information about the multidimensional state of the world when uninformed receivers' actions affect the sender's utility. Given a disclosure rule, the receivers form an expectation about the state following each message. Under the assumption that the sender's expected utility is written as the expected value of a quadratic function of those conditional expectations, we identify conditions under which full and no disclosure is optimal for the sender and show that a linear transformation of the state is optimal if it is normally distributed. We apply our theory to advertising, political campaigning, and monetary policy.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 828

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness ; Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility ; Advertising ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Monetary Policy
• Subject: information disclosure ; semidefinite programming ; linear transformation

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Tamura, Wataru
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
• (where): Osaka
• (when): 2012

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/92882
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET