Arbeitspapier

Online privacy and information disclosure by consumers

I study the welfare and price implications of consumer privacy. A consumer discloses information to a multi-product seller, which learns about the consumer's preferences, sets prices, and makes product recommendations. While the consumer benefits from accurate product recommendations, the seller may use the information to price discriminate. I show that the seller prefers to commit to not using consumer information for pricing to encourage information disclosure. However, this commitment hurts the consumer, who could be better off by pre-committing to withhold some information. In contrast to single-product models, total surplus may be lower if the seller can base prices on information.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Bank of Canada Staff Working Paper ; No. 2019-22

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Thema
Economic models

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Ichihashi, Shota
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Bank of Canada
(wo)
Ottawa
(wann)
2019

DOI
doi:10.34989/swp-2019-22
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Ichihashi, Shota
  • Bank of Canada

Entstanden

  • 2019

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