Information Disclosure and Consumer Awareness

Arbeitspapier

Whether consumers are aware of potentially adverse product effects is key to private and social incentives to disclose information about undesirable product characteristics. In a monopoly model with a mix of aware and unaware consumers, a larger share of unaware consumers makes information disclosure less likely to occur. Since the firm is not interested in releasing information to unaware consumers, a more precise targeting technology that allows the firm to better keep unaware consumers in the dark leads to more disclosure. A regulator may want to intervene in this market and impose mandatory disclosure rules.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Working Paper Series ; No. 14-28

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Economics of Regulation ; Marketing and Advertising: Government Policy and Regulation
• Subject: Information disclosure ; informative advertising ; targeted advertising ; consumer awareness ; behavioral bias ; non-common prior ; consumer protection ; behavioral industrial organization

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Li, Sanxi ; Peitz, Martin ; Zhao, Xiaojian
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of Mannheim, Department of Economics
• (where): Mannheim
• (when): 2014

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/129581
• URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-373775
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET