Arbeitspapier
Numerical Calculation of an Asymmetric Supply Function Equilibrium with Capacity Constraints
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- ISBN
-
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-20122
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Paper; No. 2005:12
Bezug (was)
Wirtschaft
Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Auctions
Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Electric Utilities
Supply function equilibrium
uniform-price auction
numerical integration
oligopoly
asymmetry
capacity constraint
wholesale electricity market
Angebot
Auktion
Oligopol
Elektrizität
Dynamisches Gleichgewicht
Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Auctions
Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Electric Utilities
Supply function equilibrium
uniform-price auction
numerical integration
oligopoly
asymmetry
capacity constraint
wholesale electricity market
Angebot
Auktion
Oligopol
Elektrizität
Dynamisches Gleichgewicht
Beteiligte Personen und Organisationen
Holmberg, Pär
Uppsala: Uppsala University, Department of Economics
Uppsala: Uppsala University, Department of Economics
Erschienen
Uppsala: Uppsala University, Department of Economics
- Rechteinformation
-
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
18.10.2021, 08:58 MESZ
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Holmberg, Pär
- Uppsala: Uppsala University, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- Uppsala: Uppsala University, Department of Economics
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
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Comparing Supply Function Equilibria of Pay-as-Bid and Uniform-Price Auctions
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Supply Function Equilibria of Pay-as-Bid Auctions
Simulation and evaluation of zonal electricity market designs
Supply Function Equilibria: Step Functions and Continuous Representations
Game-theoretical, Strategic forward Contracting in the Electricity Market
Market Power in the German Wholesale Electricity Market
Electricity markets: Designing auctions where suppliers have uncertain costs
Tacit Collusion and Capacity Withholding in Repeated Uniform Price Auctions
The Supply Function Equilibrium and Its Policy Implications for Wholesale Electricity Auctions
Asymmetric Supply Function Equilibrium with Constant Marginal Costs
Unique Supply Function Equilibrium with Capacity Constraints
Comparing Supply Function Equilibria of Pay-as-Bid and Uniform-Price Auctions
Some Inequalities related to the analysis of electricity auctions
Supply Function Equilibria of Pay-as-Bid Auctions
Simulation and evaluation of zonal electricity market designs
Supply Function Equilibria: Step Functions and Continuous Representations
Game-theoretical, Strategic forward Contracting in the Electricity Market
Market Power in the German Wholesale Electricity Market
Electricity markets: Designing auctions where suppliers have uncertain costs
Tacit Collusion and Capacity Withholding in Repeated Uniform Price Auctions
The Supply Function Equilibrium and Its Policy Implications for Wholesale Electricity Auctions
Asymmetric Supply Function Equilibrium with Constant Marginal Costs
Unique Supply Function Equilibrium with Capacity Constraints
Comparing Supply Function Equilibria of Pay-as-Bid and Uniform-Price Auctions
Some Inequalities related to the analysis of electricity auctions
Supply Function Equilibria of Pay-as-Bid Auctions
Simulation and evaluation of zonal electricity market designs
Supply Function Equilibria: Step Functions and Continuous Representations
Game-theoretical, Strategic forward Contracting in the Electricity Market
Market Power in the German Wholesale Electricity Market
Electricity markets: Designing auctions where suppliers have uncertain costs
Tacit Collusion and Capacity Withholding in Repeated Uniform Price Auctions