Arbeitspapier
Electricity markets: Designing auctions where suppliers have uncertain costs
We analyse how the market design influences the bidding behaviour in multi-unit auctions, such as wholesale electricity markets. It is shown that competition improves for increased market transparency and we identify circumstances where the auctioneer prefers uniform to discriminatory pricing. We note that political risks could significantly worsen competition in hydro-dominated markets. It would be beneficial for such markets to have clearly defined contingency plans for extreme market situations.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IFN Working Paper ; No. 1099
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Auctions
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Electric Utilities
- Thema
-
cost uncertainty
asymmetric information
uniform-price auction
discriminatory pricing
Bertrand game
market transparency
wholesale electricity market
treasury auction
Bayesian Nash equilibria
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Holmberg, Pär
Wolak, Frank A.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
- (wo)
-
Stockholm
- (wann)
-
2015
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Holmberg, Pär
- Wolak, Frank A.
- Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
Entstanden
- 2015