Electricity markets: Designing auctions where suppliers have uncertain costs

Arbeitspapier

We analyse how the market design influences the bidding behaviour in multi-unit auctions, such as wholesale electricity markets. It is shown that competition improves for increased market transparency and we identify circumstances where the auctioneer prefers uniform to discriminatory pricing. We note that political risks could significantly worsen competition in hydro-dominated markets. It would be beneficial for such markets to have clearly defined contingency plans for extreme market situations.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: IFN Working Paper ; No. 1099

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; Auctions ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; Electric Utilities
• Thema: cost uncertainty ; asymmetric information ; uniform-price auction ; discriminatory pricing ; Bertrand game ; market transparency ; wholesale electricity market ; treasury auction ; Bayesian Nash equilibria

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Holmberg, Pär ; Wolak, Frank A.
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
• (wo): Stockholm
• (wann): 2015

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/129659
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ