Arbeitspapier

Electricity markets: Designing auctions where suppliers have uncertain costs

We analyse how the market design influences the bidding behaviour in multi-unit auctions, such as wholesale electricity markets. It is shown that competition improves for increased market transparency and we identify circumstances where the auctioneer prefers uniform to discriminatory pricing. We note that political risks could significantly worsen competition in hydro-dominated markets. It would be beneficial for such markets to have clearly defined contingency plans for extreme market situations.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IFN Working Paper ; No. 1099

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Auctions
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Electric Utilities
Thema
cost uncertainty
asymmetric information
uniform-price auction
discriminatory pricing
Bertrand game
market transparency
wholesale electricity market
treasury auction
Bayesian Nash equilibria

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Holmberg, Pär
Wolak, Frank A.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
(wo)
Stockholm
(wann)
2015

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Holmberg, Pär
  • Wolak, Frank A.
  • Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)

Entstanden

  • 2015

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