Arbeitspapier

Some Inequalities related to the analysis of electricity auctions

Most balaning markets of electric power are organized as uniform-price auctions. In 2001, the balancing market of England and Wales switched to a pay-as-bid auction with the intention of reducing wholesale electricity prices. Numerical simultations of an electricity auction model have indicated that this should lead to decreased average prices. In this article we prove two inequalities which give an analytic proof of this claim in the same model.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2005:23

Classification
Wirtschaft
Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Auctions
Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Electric Utilities
Subject
supply function equilibrium
uniform-price auction
pay-as-bid auctions
discriminatory auction
oligopoly
capacity constraint
wholesale electricity markets
inequalities
Elektrizität
Auktion
Oligopol
Kapazitätsauslastung
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Hästö, Peter
Holmberg, Pär
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Uppsala University, Department of Economics
(where)
Uppsala
(when)
2005

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-20118
Last update
23.04.2022, 9:04 PM CEST

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Hästö, Peter
  • Holmberg, Pär
  • Uppsala University, Department of Economics

Time of origin

  • 2005

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