Arbeitspapier

Private information, risk aversion, and the evolution of market research

On a homogeneous oligopoly market informed sellers are fully aware of market demand whereas uninformed sellers only know the distribution. We first derive the market results when sellers are risk averse, similarly to Ponssard (1979) who assumed risk neutrality throughout. With the help of these results evolutionary processes are formulated according to which sellers can switch to market research or refrain from it depending on the difference in profits of informed and uninformed sellers. We derive the evolutionarily stable number of informed sellers and discuss how it is influenced by market parameters.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: SFB 373 Discussion Paper ; No. 2000,113

Classification
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Subject
evolution
oligopoly
market research
private information

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Güth, Sandra
Güth, Werner
Müller, Wieland
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes
(where)
Berlin
(when)
2000

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10048397
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Güth, Sandra
  • Güth, Werner
  • Müller, Wieland
  • Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes

Time of origin

  • 2000

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