Arbeitspapier
Determinants of in-group bias: group affiliation or guilt-aversion?
In-group favoritism in social dilemma situations is one of the main findings of studies in Social Identity Theory. We investigate what causes the in-group bias: is it due to mere group affiliation or, alternatively, is guilt-aversion a possible explanation? We induce group membership in a minimal group setting, observe in-/out-group transfers and elicit re- spective beliefs. We find that mere group affiliation affects beliefs and explains a substantial part of the bias, but we also find evidence in favor of guilt-aversion as a source of motivation.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2008,046
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Expectations; Speculations
- Thema
-
Social preferences
experiments
social dilemma
group identity
guilt aversion
Soziale Gruppe
Persönlichkeitspsychologie
Bias
Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion
Gefangenendilemma
Test
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Güth, Werner
Ploner, Matteo
Regner, Tobias
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
- (wo)
-
Jena
- (wann)
-
2008
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Güth, Werner
- Ploner, Matteo
- Regner, Tobias
- Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
Entstanden
- 2008
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