Arbeitspapier

Bismarck versus Beveridge: Flat- and earnings-related unemployment insurance in an efficiency wage framework

A higher unemployment compensation increases the incentive to shirk in efficiency wage models. If there is a stronger dependence of unemployment benefits on current earnings, these incentives will be reduced. An unemployment insurance with earnings-related benefits is thus characterised by higher employment than one with flat-rate benefits. It is investigated under which conditions this advantage persists in the longer term when financial constraints such as an ex-post constant level of benefits, a cash hmit or a balanced budget rule apply, or when firms are constrained to zero profits.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Diskussionsbeiträge - Serie I ; No. 291

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies; includes inheritance and gift taxes
Business Taxes and Subsidies including sales and value-added (VAT)
Nonwage Labor Costs and Benefits; Retirement Plans; Private Pensions
Labor Contracts
Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
Thema
balanced budget
cash limit
earnings-related benefits
efficiency wages
flat-rate benefits
long-run
unemployment insurance

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Goerke, Laszlo
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Universität Konstanz, Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaften und Statistik
(wo)
Konstanz
(wann)
1998

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Goerke, Laszlo
  • Universität Konstanz, Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaften und Statistik

Entstanden

  • 1998

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