Arbeitspapier
Bismarck versus Beveridge: Flat- and earnings-related unemployment insurance in an efficiency wage framework
A higher unemployment compensation increases the incentive to shirk in efficiency wage models. If there is a stronger dependence of unemployment benefits on current earnings, these incentives will be reduced. An unemployment insurance with earnings-related benefits is thus characterised by higher employment than one with flat-rate benefits. It is investigated under which conditions this advantage persists in the longer term when financial constraints such as an ex-post constant level of benefits, a cash hmit or a balanced budget rule apply, or when firms are constrained to zero profits.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Diskussionsbeiträge - Serie I ; No. 291
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies; includes inheritance and gift taxes
Business Taxes and Subsidies including sales and value-added (VAT)
Nonwage Labor Costs and Benefits; Retirement Plans; Private Pensions
Labor Contracts
Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
- Thema
-
balanced budget
cash limit
earnings-related benefits
efficiency wages
flat-rate benefits
long-run
unemployment insurance
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Goerke, Laszlo
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Universität Konstanz, Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaften und Statistik
- (wo)
-
Konstanz
- (wann)
-
1998
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Goerke, Laszlo
- Universität Konstanz, Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaften und Statistik
Entstanden
- 1998