Arbeitspapier

Earnings-related severance pay

In an efficiency wage economy, lump-sum severance pay from which shirkers can be excluded raises employment. However, severance payments are usually related to wages. It is shown that earnings-related, mandated severance pay will have ambiguous employment effects if effort can be varied continuously. A substitution of the earnings-related for the lump-sum component reduces employment. Thus, the prevalent form of severance payments in OECD countries might have less advantageous employment effects than previously conjectured.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 2232

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Nonwage Labor Costs and Benefits; Retirement Plans; Private Pensions
Labor Contracts
Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
Thema
earnings relationship
efficiency wages
employment
severance pay
Effizienzlohn
Abfindung
Beschäftigung
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Goerke, Laszlo
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2006

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Goerke, Laszlo
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2006

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