Arbeitspapier

Earnings-related severance pay

In an efficiency wage economy, lump-sum severance pay from which shirkers can be excluded raises employment. However, severance payments are usually related to wages. It is shown that earnings-related, mandated severance pay will have ambiguous employment effects if effort can be varied continuously. A substitution of the earnings-related for the lump-sum component reduces employment. Thus, the prevalent form of severance payments in OECD countries might have less advantageous employment effects than previously conjectured.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 2232

Classification
Wirtschaft
Nonwage Labor Costs and Benefits; Retirement Plans; Private Pensions
Labor Contracts
Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
Subject
earnings relationship
efficiency wages
employment
severance pay
Effizienzlohn
Abfindung
Beschäftigung
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Goerke, Laszlo
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(where)
Bonn
(when)
2006

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Goerke, Laszlo
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Time of origin

  • 2006

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