Arbeitspapier

Unemployment insurance savings accounts and collective wage determination

Unemployment Insurance Savings Accounts (UISAs) entitle workers to unemployment benefits at the expense of future pension payments. Therefore, such accounts make unemployment less attractive, intensify job search, and raise employment. In the present paper the wage and employment consequences of UISAs are investigated in a model of collective wage determination. In the basic set-up, UISAs induce a trade union to lower wages. This effect can also arise if (1) balanced-budget repercussions are taken into account, (2) individual job search is incorporated, and (3) wage-dependent pensions are allowed for. However, the requirements for negative wage effects to arise become stricter than in the base model. Thus, collective bargaining creates additional impediments for the positive employment consequences of UISAs.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 3141

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
Employment
trade union
unemployment accounts
unemployment benefits
wages
Arbeitslosenversicherung
Privatversicherung
Private Rentenversicherung
Tarifpolitik
Wirkungsanalyse
Lohn
Beschäftigungseffekt
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Goerke, Laszlo
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2007

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Goerke, Laszlo
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2007

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