Unemployment insurance savings accounts and collective wage determination

Arbeitspapier

Unemployment Insurance Savings Accounts (UISAs) entitle workers to unemployment benefits at the expense of future pension payments. Therefore, such accounts make unemployment less attractive, intensify job search, and raise employment. In the present paper the wage and employment consequences of UISAs are investigated in a model of collective wage determination. In the basic set-up, UISAs induce a trade union to lower wages. This effect can also arise if (1) balanced-budget repercussions are taken into account, (2) individual job search is incorporated, and (3) wage-dependent pensions are allowed for. However, the requirements for negative wage effects to arise become stricter than in the base model. Thus, collective bargaining creates additional impediments for the positive employment consequences of UISAs.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 3141

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft
• Subject: Employment ; trade union ; unemployment accounts ; unemployment benefits ; wages ; Arbeitslosenversicherung ; Privatversicherung ; Private Rentenversicherung ; Tarifpolitik ; Wirkungsanalyse ; Lohn ; Beschäftigungseffekt ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Goerke, Laszlo
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
• (where): Bonn
• (when): 2007

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/34248
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET