Bismarck versus Beveridge: Flat- and earnings-related unemployment insurance in an efficiency wage framework

Arbeitspapier

A higher unemployment compensation increases the incentive to shirk in efficiency wage models. If there is a stronger dependence of unemployment benefits on current earnings, these incentives will be reduced. An unemployment insurance with earnings-related benefits is thus characterised by higher employment than one with flat-rate benefits. It is investigated under which conditions this advantage persists in the longer term when financial constraints such as an ex-post constant level of benefits, a cash hmit or a balanced budget rule apply, or when firms are constrained to zero profits.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Diskussionsbeiträge - Serie I ; No. 291

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies; includes inheritance and gift taxes ; Business Taxes and Subsidies including sales and value-added (VAT) ; Nonwage Labor Costs and Benefits; Retirement Plans; Private Pensions ; Labor Contracts ; Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
• Subject: balanced budget ; cash limit ; earnings-related benefits ; efficiency wages ; flat-rate benefits ; long-run ; unemployment insurance

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Goerke, Laszlo
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Universität Konstanz, Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaften und Statistik
• (where): Konstanz
• (when): 1998

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/68928
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET