Endogenous community formation and collective provision: A procedurally fair mechanism

Arbeitspapier

A group of actors, individuals or firms, can engage in collectively providing projects which may be costly or generating revenues and which may benefit some and harm others. Based on requirements of procedural fairness (Güth and Kliemt, 2013), we derive a bidding mechanism determining endogenously who participates in collective provision, which projects are implemented, and the positive or negative payments due to the participating members. We justify and discuss this procedural fairness approach and compare it with that of optimal, e.g. welfaristic game theoretic mechanism design (e.g. Myerson, 1979).

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2013-013

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Auctions ; Value Theory ; Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis ; Externalities ; Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement ; Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption ; Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
• Subject: Collective action ; equality axiom ; mechanism design ; procedural fairness ; public provision

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Güth, Werner
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
• (where): Jena
• (when): 2013

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/85033
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET