Arbeitspapier

Effciency Concern under Asymmetric Information

Experimental evidence from simple distribution games supports the view that some individuals have a concern for the effciency of allocations. This motive could be important for the implementation of economic policy proposals. In a typical lab experiment, however, individuals have much more information available than outside the lab. We conduct a lab experiment to test whether asymmetric information influences prosocial behavior in a simple non-strategic interaction. In our setting, a dictator has only limited knowledge about the benefits his prosocial action generates for a recipient. We find that a substantial share of subjects behaves proscially and a concern for effciency plays an important role. In our experiment the information asymmetry is actually effciency-enhancing as more subjects behave prosocially than under symmetric information.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper Series ; No. 13-07

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Winschel, Evguenia
Zahn, Philipp
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Mannheim, Department of Economics
(wo)
Mannheim
(wann)
2012

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-330056
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Winschel, Evguenia
  • Zahn, Philipp
  • University of Mannheim, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2012

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