Arbeitspapier
Effciency Concern under Asymmetric Information
Experimental evidence from simple distribution games supports the view that some individuals have a concern for the effciency of allocations. This motive could be important for the implementation of economic policy proposals. In a typical lab experiment, however, individuals have much more information available than outside the lab. We conduct a lab experiment to test whether asymmetric information influences prosocial behavior in a simple non-strategic interaction. In our setting, a dictator has only limited knowledge about the benefits his prosocial action generates for a recipient. We find that a substantial share of subjects behaves proscially and a concern for effciency plays an important role. In our experiment the information asymmetry is actually effciency-enhancing as more subjects behave prosocially than under symmetric information.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Working Paper Series ; No. 13-07
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Winschel, Evguenia
Zahn, Philipp
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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University of Mannheim, Department of Economics
- (wo)
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Mannheim
- (wann)
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2012
- Handle
- URN
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urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-330056
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Winschel, Evguenia
- Zahn, Philipp
- University of Mannheim, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2012