Arbeitspapier
Equity, envy and efficiency under asymmetric information
The set of fair (i.e. envy free and efficient) allocation rules may be empty in wellbehaved pure exchange economies if the agents are asymmetrically informed at the time of contracting. In addition, there may exist efficient allocation rules such that every agent envies another.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Working Paper ; No. 2004-19
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Subject
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Asymmetrische Information
Tauschwirtschaft
Gerechtigkeit
Allokationseffizienz
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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de Clippel, Geoffroy
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Brown University, Department of Economics
- (where)
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Providence, RI
- (when)
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2004
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- de Clippel, Geoffroy
- Brown University, Department of Economics
Time of origin
- 2004