Arbeitspapier

Equity, envy and efficiency under asymmetric information

The set of fair (i.e. envy free and efficient) allocation rules may be empty in wellbehaved pure exchange economies if the agents are asymmetrically informed at the time of contracting. In addition, there may exist efficient allocation rules such that every agent envies another.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2004-19

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
Asymmetrische Information
Tauschwirtschaft
Gerechtigkeit
Allokationseffizienz

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
de Clippel, Geoffroy
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Brown University, Department of Economics
(where)
Providence, RI
(when)
2004

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • de Clippel, Geoffroy
  • Brown University, Department of Economics

Time of origin

  • 2004

Other Objects (12)