Arbeitspapier

On the efficiency properties of the Roy's model under asymmetric information

We consider Roy's economies with perfectly competitive labor markets and asymmetric information. Firms choose their investments in physical capital before observing the characteristics of the labor markets they will face. We provide conditions under which equilibrium allocations are constrained Pareto efficient, i.e., such that it is impossible to improve upon the equilibrium allocation by changing agents' investments and letting the other endogenous variables adjust to restore market clearing. We also provide a robust example of a class of economies where these conditions fail and where equilibria are characterized by overinvestments in high skills. Finally, we discuss some implications of our main results for the optimal taxation literature.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IAB-Discussion Paper ; No. 8/2014

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Welfare Economics: General
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
Thema
Roy's model
human capital
constrained Pareto efficiency

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Mendolicchio, Concetta
Pietra, Tito
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB)
(wo)
Nürnberg
(wann)
2014

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Mendolicchio, Concetta
  • Pietra, Tito
  • Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB)

Entstanden

  • 2014

Ähnliche Objekte (12)