Arbeitspapier
Egalitarian equivalence under asymmetric information
We propose a definition of egalitarian equivalence that extends Pazner and Schmeidler's (1978) concept to environments with incomplete information. If every feasible allocation rule can be implemented by an incentive compatible mechanism (as, for instance, in the case of non-exclusive information), then interim egalitarian equivalence and interim incentive efficiency remain compatible, as they were under complete information. When incentive constraints are more restrictive, on the other hand, the two criteria may become incompatible.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2010-5
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Externalities
Cooperative Games
- Thema
-
Pareto Efficiency
Egalitarian Equivalence
Asymmetric Information
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
de Clippel, Geoffroy
Pérez-Castrillo, David
Wettstein, David
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Brown University, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Providence, RI
- (wann)
-
2010
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:47 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- de Clippel, Geoffroy
- Pérez-Castrillo, David
- Wettstein, David
- Brown University, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2010
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Privatization under Asymmetric Information
Delegating Recruitment under Asymmetric Information
Effciency Concern under Asymmetric Information
Interbank market integration under asymmetric information
Search and Retirement under Asymmetric Information
Sovereign Debt Renegotiation under Asymmetric Information
Equity, envy and efficiency under asymmetric information
Financing incremental abatement costs under asymmetric information
Foreign Aid and Policies under Asymmetric Information
Optimal Regulatory Pricing Under Asymmetric Cost Information
Limit-Order Submission Strategies under Asymmetric Information
Intergovernmental grants and financial autonomy under asymmetric information
Privatization under Asymmetric Information
Delegating Recruitment under Asymmetric Information
Effciency Concern under Asymmetric Information
Interbank market integration under asymmetric information
Search and Retirement under Asymmetric Information
Sovereign Debt Renegotiation under Asymmetric Information
Equity, envy and efficiency under asymmetric information
Financing incremental abatement costs under asymmetric information
Foreign Aid and Policies under Asymmetric Information
Optimal Regulatory Pricing Under Asymmetric Cost Information
Limit-Order Submission Strategies under Asymmetric Information
Intergovernmental grants and financial autonomy under asymmetric information
Privatization under Asymmetric Information
Delegating Recruitment under Asymmetric Information
Effciency Concern under Asymmetric Information
Interbank market integration under asymmetric information
Search and Retirement under Asymmetric Information
Sovereign Debt Renegotiation under Asymmetric Information
Equity, envy and efficiency under asymmetric information
Financing incremental abatement costs under asymmetric information
Foreign Aid and Policies under Asymmetric Information
Optimal Regulatory Pricing Under Asymmetric Cost Information
Limit-Order Submission Strategies under Asymmetric Information