Arbeitspapier
Privatization under Asymmetric Information
This paper models privatization as a cooperative game between the government, a trade union and the private shareholders. These players kno w that privatization increases the efficiency of a firm, but only the management of the firm knows the exact value of the relevant productivity-increasing parameter. This incomplete information changes many of the results which were attained in Bös (1991) in a full-information setting.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 244
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
Privatization
asymmetric information
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Bös, Dieter
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2000
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Bös, Dieter
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2000