Arbeitspapier
Egalitarian equivalence under asymmetric information
We propose a definition of egalitarian equivalence that extends Pazner and Schmeidler's (1978) concept to environments with incomplete information. If every feasible allocation rule can be implemented by an incentive compatible mechanism (as, for instance, in the case of non-exclusive information), then interim egalitarian equivalence and interim incentive efficiency remain compatible, as they were under complete information. When incentive constraints are more restrictive, on the other hand, the two criteria may become incompatible.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Working Paper ; No. 2010-5
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Externalities
Cooperative Games
- Subject
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Pareto Efficiency
Egalitarian Equivalence
Asymmetric Information
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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de Clippel, Geoffroy
Pérez-Castrillo, David
Wettstein, David
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Brown University, Department of Economics
- (where)
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Providence, RI
- (when)
-
2010
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:47 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- de Clippel, Geoffroy
- Pérez-Castrillo, David
- Wettstein, David
- Brown University, Department of Economics
Time of origin
- 2010
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