Dissolving an ambiguous partnership

Arbeitspapier

Two partners try to dissolve a partnership that owns an asset of ambiguous value, where the value is determined ex post by a draw from an Ellsberg urn. In a within-subject experiment, subjects make decisions in three different bargaining mechanisms: unstructured bargaining, the Texas shoot-out, and a K + 1 auction. We find that the K +1 auction is the most effcient mechanism, which is in line with theory. Free format bargaining yields a surprising number of disagreements, which are not usually observed when the partnership has a certain or risky value.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: AWI Discussion Paper Series ; No. 733

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual ; Noncooperative Games ; Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
• Subject: Bargaining ; ambiguity ; experiment

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Oechssler, Joerg ; Roomets, Alex
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
• (where): Heidelberg
• (when): 2023

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.11588/heidok.00033829
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/283379
• URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-heidok-338294
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET