Arbeitspapier
The Design of Ambiguous Mechanisms
This paper explores the sale of an object to an ambiguity averse buyer. We show that the seller can increase his profit by using an ambiguous mechanism. That is, the seller can benefit from hiding certain features of the mechanism that he has committed to from the agent. We then characterize the profit maximizing mechanisms for the seller and characterize the conditions under which the seller can gain by employing an ambiguous mechanism.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 4949
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Auctions
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Thema
-
optimal mechanism design
ambiguity aversion
incentive compatibility
individual rationality
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Di Tillio, Alfredo
Kos, Nenad
Messner, Matthias
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2014
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Di Tillio, Alfredo
- Kos, Nenad
- Messner, Matthias
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2014