Arbeitspapier
Ambiguous Protection
Import regulations are globally the most prevalent form of intervention in international trade. The regulations should, under rules of the WTO, protect consumers and the environment but can be used to protect producers. We investigate the ambiguity of intent. We set out a model that when applied empirically suggests, as a benchmark estimate, equal divide between social benefit and producer protection. Inefficiency and distributional effects are consistent with producerprotecting trade policy. Country diversity in use of regulations supplements our estimates in suggesting producer-protecting intent. We look at how WTO procedures have allowed producer protection in the guise of social benefit.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 8888
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
Empirical Studies of Trade
Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility
Economics of Regulation
- Thema
-
protectionism
World Trade Organization
regulation
non-tariff barriers
public safety
environmental protection
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Gründler, Klaus
Hillman, Arye L.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2021
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Gründler, Klaus
- Hillman, Arye L.
- Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2021