Arbeitspapier

Ambiguous Protection

Import regulations are globally the most prevalent form of intervention in international trade. The regulations should, under rules of the WTO, protect consumers and the environment but can be used to protect producers. We investigate the ambiguity of intent. We set out a model that when applied empirically suggests, as a benchmark estimate, equal divide between social benefit and producer protection. Inefficiency and distributional effects are consistent with producerprotecting trade policy. Country diversity in use of regulations supplements our estimates in suggesting producer-protecting intent. We look at how WTO procedures have allowed producer protection in the guise of social benefit.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 8888

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
Empirical Studies of Trade
Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility
Economics of Regulation
Thema
protectionism
World Trade Organization
regulation
non-tariff barriers
public safety
environmental protection

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Gründler, Klaus
Hillman, Arye L.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2021

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Gründler, Klaus
  • Hillman, Arye L.
  • Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2021

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