Ambiguous social choice functions

Arbeitspapier

Call a mechanism that associates each profile of preferences over candidates to an ambiguous act an Ambiguous Social Function (ASCF). This paper studies the strategy-proofness of ASCFs. We find that an ASCF is unanimous and strategyproof if and only if there exists a nonempty subset of voters, called the set of top voters, such that at each preference profile, the range of the selected act equals the set of top-ranked candidates of top voters. We provide a full characterization of the class of unanimous, strategyproof, and anonymous ASCFs, and provide a large subclass of ASCFs that satisfy the additional property of neutrality.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers ; No. 660

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
• Thema: Social Choice Function ; Ambiguity Aversion ; Ellsberg Urns ; Strategy-proofness ; Unanimity ; Anonymity ; Neutrality

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Demeze-Jouatsa, Ghislain-Herman
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW)
• (wo): Bielefeld
• (wann): 2021

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/249883
• URN: urn:nbn:de:0070-pub-29603681
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ