Arbeitspapier

Ambiguous social choice functions

Call a mechanism that associates each profile of preferences over candidates to an ambiguous act an Ambiguous Social Function (ASCF). This paper studies the strategy-proofness of ASCFs. We find that an ASCF is unanimous and strategyproof if and only if there exists a nonempty subset of voters, called the set of top voters, such that at each preference profile, the range of the selected act equals the set of top-ranked candidates of top voters. We provide a full characterization of the class of unanimous, strategyproof, and anonymous ASCFs, and provide a large subclass of ASCFs that satisfy the additional property of neutrality.

Language: Englisch

Bibliographic citation: Series: Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers ; No. 660

Classification: Wirtschaft
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

Subject: Social Choice Function
Ambiguity Aversion
Ellsberg Urns
Strategy-proofness
Unanimity
Anonymity
Neutrality

Event: Geistige Schöpfung

(who): Demeze-Jouatsa, Ghislain-Herman

Event: Veröffentlichung

(who): Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW)

(where): Bielefeld

(when): 2021

Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/249883

URN: urn:nbn:de:0070-pub-29603681

Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

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Object type

Arbeitspapier

Associated

Demeze-Jouatsa, Ghislain-Herman
Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW)

Time of origin

2021

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