- Standort
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Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- ISSN
-
1432-0479
- Umfang
-
Online-Ressource
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Anmerkungen
-
online resource.
- Erschienen in
-
On the nonemptiness of approximate cores of large games ; day:5 ; month:11 ; year:2016 ; pages:1-19
Economic theory ; (5.11.2016), 1-19
- Urheber
- Beteiligte Personen und Organisationen
- DOI
-
10.1007/s00199-016-1010-3
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:1111-201611308666
- Rechteinformation
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
- 14.08.2025, 10:49 MESZ
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Beteiligte
- Allouch, Nizar
- Wooders, Myrna Holtz
- SpringerLink (Online service)
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