- Standort
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Umfang
-
Online-Ressource
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics ; 326
- Schlagwort
-
Core
Kooperatives Spiel
Theorie
Kern
Kooperatives Spiel
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wo)
-
Bielefeld
- (wer)
-
Center for Mathematical Economics
- (wann)
-
2001
- Urheber
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:0070-pub-29098758
- Rechteinformation
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
25.03.2025, 13:51 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Beteiligte
- Orshan, Gooni
- Sudhölter, Peter
- Center for Mathematical Economics
Entstanden
- 2001
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