A Non-cooperative Foundation of Core-Stability in Positive Externality NTU-Coalition Games

Arbeitspapier

We identify the core as an appealing stability concept of cooperative game theory, but argue that the non-cooperative approach has conceptual advantages in the context of economic problems with externalities. Therefore, we derive a non-cooperative foundation of core-stability for positive externality NTU-games. First, in the spirit of Hart/Kurz (1983), we develop a game that we call ?-game and show that strong Nash equilibria coalition structures in this game are identical to ?- and ?-core stable coalition structures. Second, as a by-product of the definition of the ?-game, we develop an extension called an ?-game. Finally, we compare equilibria in the ?- and ?-game with those in the ?- and ?-game of Hart and Kurz (1983).

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 31.2003

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games
• Subject: Core-stability ; non-cooperative game theory ; positive externality games ; Transferierbarer Nutzen ; Core ; Koalition ; Externer Effekt ; Theorie ; Nichtkooperatives Spiel

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Finus, Michael ; Rundshagen, Bianca
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
• (where): Milano
• (when): 2003

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/118063
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET